Rather it proceeds under what is now N.J.S. The indictment does not proceed under that section. 2 A:131-5, which provides that, if a person has made contradictory statements under oath, it shall not be necessary to allege which statement is false but it shall be sufficient to set forth the contradictory statements and allege in the alternative that one or the other is false. In part, the demand appears to rest upon a misconception of the theory of the indictment. This demand seeks a revelation of evidence as such and does not come within the principles as we understand them, at least in the absence of a special showing which is not here made. We understand that defendant had testified at a prior trial of the homicide charge.
Indeed, it is settled that an indictment deficient for want of a statement of the essential facts may not be saved by a bill of particulars, State v. That an indictment satisfies the stated rule is no barrier to a bill of particulars.
An indictment must allege "the essential facts constituting the offense charged." This ancient rule is expressed in R.R. This standard is not the equivalent of the standard prescribed for the sufficiency of an indictment itself. This rule explicitly states the purpose of a bill of particulars to be "to enable the defendant to prepare his defense," and the basis to be that "the indictment * * * is not sufficiently specific" for that purpose.